Globalisation is associated with long periods of sustained economic growth and credit expansion, whereas major recessions tend to lead to falling trade and protectionism. I investigate this, using a model where an important component of trade is search by rms trying out new trade partners. To model this, I set up a schematic model of upstream-downstream matching between rms, where match quality determines prots. Prior to globalisation, Northern upstream and downstream rms work together, to avoid trade costs. As trade is liberalised, new North-South matches begin to develop, but at rst these are footloose (since many are experimental in nature), and can be driven out rapidly if there is a demand crisis.
Introductioǹ
Good times dampen anti-globalization attitudes, while bad times deepen them.' -Jagdish Bhagwati.
1
Why do periods of prolonged global growth, such as 1980-2007, tend to be accompanied by even faster growth of World trade, particularly inter-rm, interindustry trade? Why is the stalling of such growth traditionally associated with protectionism? In addressing these questions, I wish particularly to stress the two-way nature of the relationship between globalisation and worldwide growth. During the boom years prior to the Great Trade Recession of 2008, India, China and Eastern Europe were integrated into the World economy, production and supply chains were increasingly split across international borders, as highly productive intrnational partnerships and multinational enterprises spread and took advantage of global dierences in comparative advantages. Many of these features (though not the vertical fragmentation of production) replicate those of the pre-1929 globalisation boom. By contrast, the 1930s saw most of these trends go into sharp reversal (Crafts, 2004) . Despite some incidences of`murky protectionism' (in Baldwin and Evenett's 2009 terminology) there has not been a similar lurch into economic nationalism since 2008, and indeed the TTIP negotiations between the EU and USA indicate there is still a will to revive trade liberalisation, probably reecting an appreciation of the catastrophic implications when the 1929 Wall Street Crash led to a protectionist response. Against this, recent European election results suggest increasing support for nationalist and anti-globalization parties.
One reason why so many countries liberalised trade, particularly following the fall of the Soviet Union, is the (not uncontroversial) observation that more open, market-orientated economies have tended to experience faster growth. 2 In one respect, this stands in contrast to textbook economic thinking. After all, while trade is good for all economies taken together, in most circumstances textbook analysis would say that it is in the individual interests of`large' countries to impose a protectionist set of`optimal' taris on imports and exports, in order to improve their terms of trade 3 , so that there is a prisoner's dilemma situation, whereby the noncooperative outcome of tari-setting games is against the collective interest. By contrast, one might tentatively view the evidence of the pre-2007 boom as suggesting that there is little evidence of a prisoner's dilemma: open trade policies, which favour a country's neighbours, also seem in many circumstances to serve its self-interest. This is a feature which I particularly wish to investigate: is there some characteristic of globalisation booms which leads to a convergence of country and global welfare-maximising policies, 1`I n Defense of Globalization' (2004), OUP, p10. 2 Wacziarg and K.H.Welch (2008) . Kraay (2002 and . These studies are not without their critics: for example, Luebker et al (2002) . Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004) give a more overall survey of the benets of trade liberalisation. 3 e.g. Gros (1987) .
and, if so, does such a convergence break down during prolonged recessions or depressions?
In this paper, I link this, in particular, with the high observed income elasticity of trade during the economic`good times' (Ishii and Yi, 1997) . The starting point is that this high elasticity represents a footloose element of supply, which is explicitly linked to the dynamics of a search process, and which may be the rst thing to be eliminated during an economic downturn. Once this footloose element is eliminated, the economics of trade protection are turned on their head -essentially, the prisoner's dilemma is returned. This paper is one of a number of studies extending the analysis of search frictions -initially developed in the context of labour markets by Mortensen and Pissarides, among othersto inter-rm relationships. 4 The structure of the paper is as follows. The rest of Section 1 and Section 2 build on the theoretical ideas of existing papers by Ishii and Yi (1997) , Rauch and Trindade (2003) and Rauch and Casella (2003) and Helpman (2002 and 2005) , to develop a partial equilibrium model of a single industry with two-stage production, outlining the dierence between growing and declining sectors and that between matched and searching rm pairs. In Section 3, I then set up a three-phase time schema, whereby in phase 1 there is little trade, phase 2 sees globalisation and phase 3 sees an economic crisis. Section 4 discusses how either a demand crisis or a prolonged period of demand stagnation can aect this model. Section 5 is perhaps the most important part of the paper, since it develops the model into an explanation of why optimal taris may be low during periods of economic growth, but high during periods of economic slowdown. In particular, behaviour can switch from free-trade to protectionist, if there is a crisis, particularly if it is followed by growth resuming at below a critical threshold level. This is illustrated by a numerical simulation model, calibrated to a stylised data set. Section 6 discusses the implications in terms of the return of the prisoner's dilemma in trade protectionism during bad times, and emphasises the importance of maintaining a global commitment to trade liberalisation.
It is also important to ask whether search is, in fact, quantitatively important enough to inuence behaviour in the ways suggested in this paper. Evidence from Besedes and Prusa (2006) and Eaton et al. (2007) suggests fast entry and exit. Despite the small scale of rms on initial entry, during the search process, those new entrants who survive rapidly build up to account for perhaps 20-25% of trade volumes. Tentative evidence linking outsourcing to search is also discussed.
Fixed Costs, Search Costs and Trade Elasticities
It has become a commonplace that costs of market entry impede global trading patterns, such that economic integration, even in the good times of the 1990s and 2000s, falls far short of what neoclassical theory would predict (Treer, 1995, Obstfeld and Rogo, 2000) . Since this primarily reects limitations on the extensive margins of trade (in other words, the fact that most rms do not trade most products internationally), this is widely explained in terms of a xed cost of market entry (Tybout, 2002 ) -rms need to make a particular level of prot in order to justify market entry, there are both selection eects in favour of large and successful rms (Bernard et al, 2007 ) and threshold eects on entry. The latter, threshold eect can also be explained simply in terms of a Ricardian model of comparative advantage (Yi, 2003) : once trade costs fall suciently, the fragmentation of production becomes possible so that dierent stages can be carried out in dierent countries. Consequently, there is a rapid, nonlinear growth of market participation, particularly in terms of vertical tie-ups between rms (Yi, 2003) . In addition, where taris are ad valorem, eective protection against individual stages of production is magnied (since a tari may be paid more than once, as the goods cross and re-cross borders), and the same applies to transport costs -so exaggerating the apparent price-sensitivity of intermediates trade.
Many of these arguments are often summarised as the`new, new' trade theory 5 -i.e. supplementing the models of Krugman, 1979 and Helpman, 1992 , with the incorporation of rm-level participation eects and production fragmentation. These elements are now acknowledged to have powerful implications for growth through rm selection, 6 distribution 7 and the observed volatility of trade. 8 By themselves, however, they oer only a partial explanation, containing no real evidence of the nature of the xed costs of market participation, and under what circumstances they may become sunken rather than just xed. To explain this, we need to turn to another branch of the literature -the evidence of informational barriers and a search process. This stems from certain stylised facts: the high turnover of trading rms (Besedes and Prusa, 2006 ) and the evidence of network eects (Rauch and Trindade, 2003) , taken with strong evidence that clusters of low-cost producers can go unnoticed by traders for long periods (the noted example being surgical steel production in Sialkot, Pakistan 9 ). Informational barriers can generate a search process, and I argue that this process is a primary cause of threshold eects, which in turn helps explain the dynamics of trade. 10 Search takes time and requires condence and the availability of credit. Critically, rms need to incur a series of ongoing xed costs during the search process, but once they eventually achieve a satisfactory match, the cost of the past search is sunken. This means that searching rms will indeed be very sensitive to price movements, as in Ishii and Yi (1997) , but that, as the search process goes on, rms achieve 5 To use Srinivasan and Archana's (2009) terminology. 6 Melitz, 2003 . 7 Feenstra and Hanson, 1999. 8 Ishii and Yi (1997) . 9 Schmitz, 1999 . 10 Ishii and Yi (1997) use xed costs of vertical specialization to explain the high observed income elasticities of trade -which they argue cannot plausibly reconciled with more orthodox models. matches and become more heterogeneous and less subject to threshold eects. This process indicates a sensitivity of trade during the process of globalisation to international traded prices, global aggregate demand and capital availability, 11 but the trading patterns of long-established rms, which are likely to be much less sensitive, 12 and it is this nonlinearity -missed by the existing literaturewhich may underlie the danger of policy shifts during and after economic crises.
An important empirical question is how much trade, in practice, can be considered to be searching. Evidence on this is somewhat hard to come by, partly because most rm-level trade databases have until recently covered timespans too short to assess long-run industry dynamics thoroughly. Nevertheless, Besedes and Prusa's (2006) study of US imports suggests a 1 year average turnover for new products entering the market. In a model of industry dynamics, these would then be replaced by other new entrants in a repeating cycle. Eaton et al 's (2007) study of Colombian exporters shows even faster exit rates (83% of entrants in 1997 left after a year), but continuing high exit rates in the second year (38%) and third year (10%) after entry. The number of rms entering in any one year is very large compared to the overall number of rms in the market (for example, in 2005, there were 5060 rms which had been exporting for less than a year, out of 11, 720 exporters): however, rms exporting in the rst year tend to export very small amounts. The scale of survivors each year then increases steadily over at least a decade, as they expand their networks of customers. Given the continuing build-up of customers per rm over 10 years, we could also view all rms with less than ten years in the market as being searchers (which would imply nearly 25% of total sales). A slight caution here: Colombian exports tend to be dominated by small ower-growers, who can enter foreign markets easily and are less tied to a single customer (e.g. by blueprints) than exporters from other countries in other industries might be.
An alternative argument that search is quantitatively signicant is given in Edwards and Ferrett (2009) , based upon the idea that merger with a downstream supplier usually gives better coordination and security, whereas inter-rm trade benets from exibility, and so is associated with search or experimentation. This is supported by evidence from Spencer (2005) , showing that outsourcing in China preceded the growth of FDI, but that perhaps 20% of rm-level trade is still accounted for by outsourcing rather than FDI.
head. The main market for nal goods is in the North. Production requires two stages, which I name upstream (u) and downstream (d). Typically these are carried out by a pairing of rms (which may or may not be vertically integrated by merger), where u sells a semi-nished good to d, who then completes the manufacture and sells it on to nal consumers. The two rms are of equal size and ex ante expected eciency: however, productivity varies depending on the goodness of t of the match, µ i . As in Rauch and Casella (2003) or Rauch and Trindade (2003) , µ, potentially follows a uniform, rectangular distribution between 0 and 1, and rms do not know µ i before entering a match i, though they know its overall distribution. 13 Trade between the North and South develops over time. The historical setup takes three phases. In phase 1, trade costs are high, so that there is little trade, and most goods are produced by pairings of rms type u and d within the North. However, the South is assumed to have a potential comparative advantage in upstream production, while the North has a comparative advantage in downstream production. We then enter phase 2: a period of growth and global integration, spurred by a technological or policy change reducing trade costs. Some Northern, downstream rms (though not all) will now search for upstream partners in the South. For example, garments might be manufactured by an upstream rm in China, but according to designs from the downstream rm in a Western economy, which then completes the marketing and distribution worldwide. Phase 3 represents an unanticipated crisis, where credit ceases to be available and growth stalls for a protracted period.
Concentrating on phase 2, the period of globalisation, the growth of the outsourcing trade is impeded by search friction deriving from an assumed need for at least one rm to make a relationship-specic investment: in order to avoid a potential hold-up problem, 14 this generally requires a contractual relationship for at least some minimum period, which I characterise by a xed contract period, t, during which the two rms have an exclusive relationship.
Firms employ labour in the form of xed and variable elements. The cost of the latter is normalised at C = C N for North-North pairings, and at C = C S (C S < C N ) for North-South pairings. The elasticity of substitution between nal goods varieties is ε, which will also closely approximate the own-price elasticity for the output sold by rm pairings, at least as long as the number of rms, N , is large.
The model is driven by an assumed coordination cost which is inversely linearly related to the quality of the match µ i between rms in pairing i. For simplicity, I concentrate on a rather stylised model where quality of match aects xed cost, rather than unit variable costs. More precisely, I assume that xed costs are F − µ i , where F > 1 and 0 µ i 1. In addition, I assume initially that both rms in a pairing split prots equally.
The Matching Process
We now want to look at the matching process in more detail.
The paper follows Rauch and Trindade (2003) and Rauch and Casella (2003) in using a matching framework based upon Salop's circular cylinder (note that Grossman and Helpman, 2002 , use a similar setup). This is shown in Fig. 1 . Position on the circle refers to some rm-specic characteristics. The essence of the Salop model is that rms are ex ante equal in eciency, but that rm performance is determined by the degree of t with the match partner: the aim is to match with a rm directly opposite on the cylinder. Hence, match quality, µ i , is measured by the circumference distance between the two rms. Firms only have a single partner at any time.
Figure 1 The Salop matching framework
The key dierence between the match-searching model employed here and the models in the earlier papers is the ability of a rm in an unsatisfactory match to renew search, after a given contract period, t, during which rms face a discount rate r. The parameters r and t help to determine a reservation match quality, µ R . Firm pairings are also subject to sudden, random death with a constant probability of δ. For simplicity, I normalise the discount rate in terms of the contract period, dening the discount rate and depreciation rate per contract period,
(1)
Note that the depreciation rate reects the probability of either rm in a pairing dying during the contract period.
Any match with a circumference length greater than µ R will yield a prot great enough for the rms to choose to continue. This gives a probability of acceptance of 1 − µ R . However, of these pairings, proportion D will naturally expire anyway during the rst contract period, so any surviving rm will have to renew search. By contrast, proportion µ R of initial pairings will be unsatisfactory, and be dropped after one contract period.
We note that the prot of a reservation quality match (µ i = µ R ) is zero. Prot increases linearly with respect to match quality, so that the expected prot of a successful match (where
minus the prot of a reservation quality match. This yields an expected prot of
Likewise, an unsatisfactory match will have an expected prot of − µ R 2 . Finally note that a renewed search will yield a present discounted value of zero.
Probability
Expected prot above reservation Satisfactory match Both rms survive ( 
One or more dies
Unsatisfactory match Table 1 Expected returns for the matching process
We wish now to solve this problem, based upon the assumption that monopolistic competition will equate the expected return from entering a search process to zero.
Discounted prot with a successful match = one period expected loss with a poor match;
, where Φ = ρ + D;
since only the negative root lies between zero and unity. Expanding equation (3), the reservation match quality will satisfy
which is declining as ρ or D increases. From (4), we can conclude that, with zero discount rates and zero probability of rm death (r = d = ρ = D = 0), rms will be innitely patient in their search, so that the long-run equilibrium is for all rms to be equally and successfully matched. By contrast (and more realistically), with positive time preference, the long-run equilibrium has a uniform distribution of surviving matches, of quality ranging from µ R to 1, with prots likewise varying. A consequence is that rm pairings are heterogeneous in the long-run, both in terms of prots and trade volumes, with heterogeneity increasing when long-run interest rates are higher or contract periods are longer.
The role of monopolistic competition
The industry is assumed to be monopolistically competitive, on the lines of Krugman (1979) . There are both xed and variable costs. Subject to these, rms can enter or exit the market, although they need a partner (existing or new) in order to produce saleable goods. The elasticity of substitution between nal goods varieties is ε (> 1) 15 , which closely approximates the own-price elasticity for the output sold by rm pairings, at least as long as the number of rms, N , is large.
To summarise the love of variety model, we start with a Dixit-Stiglitz utility function for utility from consumption of the industry's good:
(5) 15 The restriction ε > 1 is associated with consumers' assumed`love of variety', and also helps ensure nite pricing by rms.
The rst order condition for an optimum is
where P * is the aggregate CES price of utility. We can replace the term in brackets by substituting from (5) into (6), so that
Or, by rearranging,
The industry is described as`thick' in the sense that the number of rms producing dierentiated goods is large.
When the number of rms, N , is large, then a change in Y i will have negligible impact upon U , in which case
Applying the standard protmaximising formula for a rm with constant demand elasticity and a constant marginal cost, C i , rm pairing i will charge a price of
2.3 The aggregate price level and number of rms Substituting from (9) into (8) and rearranging, we obtain an equation for the aggregate price level,
When all rms are identical, P j = P ∀j. Consequently,
which is decreasing with respect to N for ε > 1, demonstrating the love of variety eect. The prot of rm i, before taking account of xed cost, is
Prot after xed cost
where F (> 1) is xed cost with zero match quality, and µ i is match quality, which varies randomly between 0 and 1. Where all rms have identical marginal costs
In the monopolistically competitive model, a rm pairing with the reservation match quality, µ i = µ R , will just break even after its xed costs. Hence, in an equilibrium where all rms have the reservation match quality,
Substituting into (11), we obtain P * ,
Note that, in a model with constant and identical marginal cost, all rms will be of the same scale, so all will set prices and output at the level that a rm pairing with reservation match quality would set. Hence (15) and (16) describe the equilibrium with identical rms.
Another way of writing (11) is to take
Higher-Level Demand
Our model is partial equilibrium, so the aggregate price, P * , refers to a single industry. Consumption of the industry good, at price P * , leads to utility of Y (P * ). This is assumed to be isoelastic, so that
where υ > 0. Hence, substituting into (16),
For utility to be decreasing with respect to C, we need the parameter restriction that ε > υ.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas higher-level nesting of the economy, then, as long as the industry is 'small' in proportion to the overall economy, we can take overall national income as given, and hence assume υ = 1. Hence, (19) becomes
Firm threshold prices
An existing, successfully-matched rm pairing will have a match quality µ R < µ i < 1.
We dene the reservation market price, P i , for a rm with match quality µ i , as being the value of P * at which a rm with match quality µ i will break even. Beyond the initial search period, the rm will only choose to stay open if
From (13) this condition is
When µ i = µ R , this is satised by P * as calculated in the previous section. By contrast, when µ i = 1, this corresponds to
which is lower than P * , rstly because F − 1 < F − µ R , and also because the term on the denominator, is an increasing function of Y , which should improve as P falls. The intuition is that the most ecient matched rm pairings will withdraw from the market at a lower price than the threshold for new rm entry, and this dierence is greater the lower is µ R , and hence the more heterogeneous are existing matched pairings.
1−ε , assuming a top-level own price elasticity of unity for the aggregate industry produce, and substituting into (20) we can write
Hence, we have a situation where P i is proportional to C i . Also note that the reservation prices for market withdrawal when µ i = µ R and µ i = 1, in the case where marginal cost, C i = C are
3 The Stages of Development of North-South Interrm Trade I discuss the three phases of the stylised time-scheme in turn.
Phase 1: the Pre-Globalisation, Northern Economy
I start by concentrating on the initial phase 1 of our time-scheme, when trade costs are sucient to ensure that there are no matches between Northern and Southern partners. I consider an equilibrium, where the industry in the North is initially static, with demand and prices constant. I start by characterising rm pairs on this initial equilibrium growth path as`established' or`matched', if they are already in a settled match (µ i µ R ) at the start of a contract period -otherwise, we dene them as`searching'.
The basic situation is shown in Fig. 2 . Since unit variable cost with Northern pairings is 1, rm pairs will supply at a price of
Searching rms will only engage in search if the price is at least P * 1 : free entry will keep the price to this level, as long as the industry is not shrinking. Matched rm pairings will also supply at this price, though most of these are intramarginal matches, which would continue to produce if the price were to fall (hence the upward-sloping supply curve for matched rms). The number of rms in the industry will satisfy (14) , and also balance demand and supply at the price P * 1 : I will denote this initial demand level for the industry's products as Y *
.
If rms were innitely-lived, the economy would tend towards a steady-state equilibrium where all rms were matched (µ i µ R ). However, if proportion D of rm pairings suer in a given contract period from one or both rms randomly expiring, then there will be some new rms entering and searching. In equilibrium, I denote the number of matched rms in period 1 as N m1 and the number of searching rms as N s1 . In the next contract period, proportion D of existing matched pairings will expire, while proportion (1 − µ R ) of searching pairings will nd established partners. In a static equilibrium, where N m is constant over time, this implies
If the number of rms in the industry were growing at rate G, this would become This situation is shown in Fig. 2 . The price in equilibrium, P * 1 , is given by the entry price for new, searching pairings. However, there is a kink in the supply curve, since searching pairings will all enter or leave the market at P 1 = P * the market at P 1 = P * 1 , as given in equation (25) . The ratio of searching to matched rms in equilibrium is given by equation (26) or (27).
Phase 2: The Globalising Economy
Now assume that trade costs fall, so that upstream production in the South becomes more competitive. In particular, assume that unit variable costs, including trade costs, for a North-South pairing are C S , as opposed to 1 for a North-North pairing (C S < 1). However to enter the market, foreign rms of type u have to engage in a costly search process, and so will only do so at a World reference price of
at which a rm in a reservation-quality pairing breaks even. The eect on existing North-North pairings is variable. The N S1 searching Northern pairings would not expect to break even at the new, lower price, and consequently will exit the market, except for a fraction who nd their existing partners protable and become matched.
The N m1 existing matched North-North pairings are heterogeneous, since they vary in match quality between µ R and 1. The price at which a matched pairing of quality µ i will exit the market is given by
The last rm will exit when
I assume North-South pairings are not suciently low-cost to drive the price down to this level.
At price P * 2 , the critical match quality at which existing matched NorthNorth pairings which will withdraw is
at which price the proportion of North-North pairings which will continue in the market is
This is declining as C S falls. Output of these pairings will also be lower than before the start of globalisation by proportion (
, since the industry aggregate price has fallen. However, total industry output will be higher, due to the fall in prices: I denote the own-price demand elasticity for the industry's output as −η, so that
The residual will be made up by new, North-South pairings. Initially, these will be searching, but over time, in a model with static overall demand, the proportion of these still searching will decline, as some gain matches, until eventually the ratio of searching to matched pairs among the North-South pairings will equal that in equation (25) . 3 shows the situation in an economy during the globalisation phase. Searching North-South (foreign) pairings are prepared to enter the market at price P * 2 , which is lower than P * 1 , but assumed to be above P 1 . Consequently, all North-North (domestic) searching pairings exit the market, as do some matched North-North pairings. Once some North-South pairings nd successful matches, the result is a supply curve with three segments (i.e. two kinks). First, between P 2 and P 1 (the left segment), only the most successful North-South pairings will be prepared to supply. Between P 1 and P * 2 we are summing horizontally the supply curves of North-North and North-South matched pairings, so the gradient is somewhat less steep. Finally, when the industry aggregate price,
, there is a horizontal segment made up of searching North-South pairings.
The kinks in this supply curve are an important element in explaining the dierential eects of economic shocks, and the potential change in policy following such shocks -as explained in the subsequent sections. Fig. 4 summarises some simulations on the evolution of the proportions of dierent types of rm pairings over time, following a 10% reduction in the cost of North-South pairings. These are based upon the parameter assumptions in Table 2 .
Parameter We now want to consider the eect of shocks to an economy which has been undergoing the process of globalisation (in the sense of entry by searching foreign upstream rms, and the gradual development of successful, importing partnerships). Take the situation in Fig. 3 and assume that there is a sudden inward shift in the demand curve, caused by a recession. The situation is shown in Fig. 5 : essentially, searching foreign rms are footloose, and will simply exit the market at the end of their existing contracts (except for the minority who nd protable contracts). This is a component of import supply which is very sensitive to demand changes. Consequently, unless the demand shock is very large, it can be accommodated simply by the exit of these rms: the remaining foreign and domestic rms see very little change in their demand or prices. Only larger shocks will force established rm pairings back down their supply curves. , and continues to rise thereafter, as more rms are driven out.
The situation with a larger negative demand shock is that, only after seaching rms have been eliminated will prices be driven down. At this point, existing domestic pairings, as well as established importing pairings will be faced with falling prices, and the least ecient will be eliminated (so driving the rms down their supply curves).
Note that an implication is that the rst rm pairings to exit the market are searching, North-South pairings, so that trade is especially vulnerable to a medium shock. In the larger shock in Figure 4 , matched North-North pairings will exit at the margin faster than matched North-South pairings in the ratio
One should perhaps not be surprised by this nding. Trade search can be viewed as a kind of capital formation, with rms prepared to undergo losses in the early years of search, in order to make an expected positive return thereafter, once they are established. Like any form of capital formation, we would expect search capital formation to be sensitive, both to changes in the cost and availability of credit, and to accelerator-type changes in overall demand growth. That is what this model indicates.
Endogenous Policy Responses to a Boom, a Shock or Stagnation
We have so far established that, during a globalisation boom, where demand and imports are rising fast, there should be at any one time a relatively high proportion of trade which is accounted for by searching rms, whose presence in the market is footloose, and who are vulnerable to either demand and/or credit shocks. This, by itself, implies that the globalisation process can be suddenly halted by unexpected shocks, regardless of any policy response. Moreover, since search is necessary for the long-run growth of trade, a shock may have a prolonged negative impact upon trade. We now want to consider how trade policy might respond to economic circumstances, given a search model, where various components of foreign supply dier greatly in terms of their price sensitivity. In this context, it is worth bearing in mind that, where trade is between rms who are specically matched, all countries can be considered`large' from the point-of-view of trade policy, since trade with a matched partner is dierentiated from trade with any other potential partner, yielding potential monopsony power to the importing country (and monopoly power to the exporting country). We will follow a modied version of the standard`large country, partial equilibrium' exposition of optimal tari policy (see, for example, van Marrewijk, 2007, section 8.3). Fig. 6 shows schematically the eects of imposing a tari on an economy with a large amount of initial importers who are searching (and hence pricesensitive). It has been drawn slightly dierently to Figures 1,2,4 ,5 and 6, since domestic supply is now subtracted from consumers' demand, to give a demand curve for imports. (Note that the domestic supply curve increases less quickly above P * , since a rise in price does not aect the number of domestic rms, while a fall in price will cause further exit). The elastic portion of the supply curve, accounted for by the initial searching importers, means that a tari has to be substantial before it can begin to lower the import price. The welfare eects of this are that there is a rise in consumer prices (causing a welfare loss), and no fall in import costs. There is, however, some tari revenue from the higher price paid by consumers (though there is still a deadweight loss). Since the model is monopolistically competitive, and prices exceed marginal costs, there is also a prot-shifting eect from the increase in market share borne by domestic producers (see Brander and Krugman, 1983) . (This eect will only be enough to outweigh the loss of consumer surplus when the elasticity of substitution, ε, is low enough to generate high prot margins, yet still large enough for domestic sales to increase signicantly.) Figure   Figure 6 Eect of a low tari, τ 1 Fig. 7 shows a larger tari, which begins to lower import prices (c.f. the large, open economy partial equilibrium model in many trade textbooks). The fall in import prices (by driving out the less ecient importers) means that some of the tari revenue is at the expense of importers rather than consumers. However, the presence of the at segment (the threshold eect) means that this eect (when combined with the prot-shifting eect) needs to be large to oset the loss of consumer surplus, since only sizeable taris will begin to reduce traded prices. By contrast, where there are few initial searching rms, a tari begins much more quickly to impact upon traded prices. The implication is that there is likely to be a discontinuity in tari-setting: when the sector is shrinking, or growing slowly, optimal taris are positive, while, when the sectoral rate of import growth exceeds a threshold rate, optimal taris fall to zero.
The analysis here is somewhat simplied, since in reality one needs to consider taris in a dynamic setting. In due course, even with a tari, the natural death of existing matched rms will lead the economy back to a position where searching rms begin to reenter the market -under some circumstances, we would expect this to lead to a cycle of optimal taris over time. Nevertheless, the situation with stalled growth indicates a signicant dierence between eras of prolonged trade growth, where protection is not favoured, and eras of stagnation, where it is.
Numerical Simulation Analysis
To examine the eects of a crisis and/or a period of stalling of growth, I set up a numerical simulation of the partial equilibrium model outlined in Total expenditure on the product M 1000. Table 3 Parameters for numerical simulation
An elasticity between rms of ε = 10 is consistent with many recent studies of trade elasticities (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004) .
The model is calibrated to a series of equilibrium starting growth paths for a variety of growth rates between −2% and +9% per annum. The former case corresponds to the situation where G + D = 0, and so is a situation where in equilibrium there are no searching rms. The higher the initial growth rate, the more searching rms there will be.
To summarise the results of the simulations:
Given the parameter assumptions, a tari that eliminates searching rms reduces national welfare. This is because, while the tari is not large enough to remove more than the price-sensitive, searching component of supply, import prices do not fall. Consequently, the tari revenue plus protshifting are insucient at the margin to outweigh the loss of consumer surplus. The results are shown in Table 4 .
Growth Table 4 eect of steady-state growth rate on share of searching rms, tari required to exclude them and associated national welfare loss
Note that, where the elasticity of substitution is lower, or the initial share of domestic production is higher, then the prot-shifting eect will be larger, and may outweigh the loss of consumer surplus.
Driving searching rms out is costlier to welfare, the higher is the initial growth rate of trade. This should not be seen as surprising, since a higher tari is required when there are more searching rms to start with.
Once searching rms have been driven out, a further rise in the tari rst increases and then reduces welfare. It is worth remembering that, once searching rms have been driven out, the analysis is closer to the typical large country model of trade, where a tari is initially welfare-improving, by reducing import prices. Only later do the marginal costs of a tari outweigh the benets.
This result is important in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, where a fall in demand or a collapse of credit have resulted in the exclusion of searching rms. In this case, there are no initial searching rms, and welfare will always benet from some tari (in this case, reaching a non-cooperative`optimal tari' of around 4%, reducing trade by around 32% in total.
Whether or not a tari can improve national welfare depends on the initial number of searching rms. The faster the initial growth rate of the economy, the more searching rms have to be driven out before a tari can start to improve the country's terms of trade. Consequently, the inverted-U curve of welfare starts from a lower point. Beyond some threshold rate of growth (in this case, approximately G = 5%), a country will switch from charging aǹ optimal tari' to free trade. This is also summarised in Fig. 8 , which shows the simulated`optimal tari' for dierent initial growth rates: For growth rates below about 5% per annum, countries will choose noncooperative taris of around 4% on trade. By contrast, above this threshold growth rate, there is a sudden, nonlinear shift to a zero noncooperative tari, as countries prefer free trade, in order to attract the more footloose, searching rms.
Again, this result is dependent upon the substitution elasticity assumed, and upon the initial import share (a lower substitution elasticity and/or lower import share would raise the growth threshold needed to make taris unattractive, while a higher substitution elasticity or higher import share would do the reverse). 16 The evidence that there is a threshold growth rate required to induce countries to maintain open markets is signicant. As long as G + D > 0, new rm entry into trade will eventually resume following a crisis. However, many economic shocks -such as Latin America in the early 1980s, Japan in the early 1990s and the Asian Tigers in 1997 -tend to be followed by either stagnation (a`lost decade') or at least reduced growth for a prolonged period. If growth falls below a critical trigger, the analysis of this section suggests that open trade policies may be harder to sustain.
Is Search Sucient to Trigger a Policy Switch?
While the model in the preceding section is somewhat sensitive to parameter choices, it does indicate certain important properties: in particular, a prolonged period of high global trade growth will favour little or no protectionism, but only if the growth rate exceeds a critical threshold (maybe around 5% per annum).
The Eaton et al (2007) estimates of search would suggest values (during the growth cycle) quite close to that required on our parameter assumptions to trigger a switch to zero protectionism. This may indicate that countries would be likely to favour free trade in faster-growing industries, while maybe not in others. Following the crisis of 2008-2009, it is likely that few industries would still have enough search to make unilateral free trade attractive.
It is worth bearing in mind that, in a CES demand formulation, the protshifting eect (which makes taris more attractive) is higher in industries with a lower import share.
6 Implications: Return of the Prisoner's Dilemma in Trade Liberalisation?
Trade liberalisation is often portrayed as a prisoner's dilemma situation: liberalisation benets countries collectively, but large countries, individually, have an incentive to cheat and impose optimal (terms-of-trade-improving) taris. By contrast, in recent decades (and despite the failure of the Doha Round talks), trade liberalisation has undoubtedly made substantial strides -particularly with respect to developing countries. In general, the argument that high taris benet national income -at least, when based upon terms of trade arguments -has rarely been used. An exception may be in agricultural commodities. 16 See author for details.
Part of the reason may be a trend towards accepting that the price elasticity of demand for traded commodities is perhaps higher than we used to thinkfor example, Anderson and van Wincoop's (2004) survey cites elasticities of between 5 and 10 for many commodities: a far higher number than traditionally used in Armington CGE models of the 1980s and 1990s. 17 These higher trade elasticities have been theoretically reconciled with observed trade data by the acceptance of substantial Ricardian, xed-factor elements in trade, 18 including rm heterogeneity, which mean that supply elasticities are reduced. However, a search-based interpretation would say that supply elasticities dier considerably ex ante and ex post, and that expanding supply may be more elastic than contracting supply.
A prolonged global recession could potentially change this situation for the worse (as memories of the 1930s indicate). 19 In terms of the very schematic analysis of this paper, we are moving from the situation in Figure 6 , where there is a substantial volume of footloose trade, to that in Figure 7 , where the supply of price-elastic, searching trade is insucient to maintain the incentive to keep taris low. In such a situation, the interests of individual countries (which may wish to try to manipulate their terms of trade by protection) and those of the global economy are no longer aligned, hence raising the risks of triggering a round of beggar-thy-neighbour policies.
In sum: the pre-2008 wave of globalisation was sustained and strengthened by the coming-together of national and global interests, when trade is relatively footloose and credit is available. It seems that, since 2008, the advice of economists to learn from history and avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1930s has largely been heeded. However, a resumption of growth is probably the best insurance against a resurgence of protectionist forces.
